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A SURVIVING VERSION OF THE COMMON SENSE
PROBLEM OF EVIL: A REPLY TO TWEEDT
Jerome Gellman

Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to the “common sense problem of evil,”
on which that there is gratuitous evil is justified non-inferentially as a trivial
inference from non-inferentially justified premises by invoking versions of
CORNEA. Tweedt claims his solution applies not only to the versions of the
common sense problem of evil offered by Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty,
but also to that offered by me in this journal in 1992. Here I argue that Tweedt
fails to defeat this version of the problem. So even if Tweedt’s response to
Draper and Dougherty is successful, a version of the common sense problem
of evil survives.

Recently Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to “the common sense
problem of evil” (hereafter: “CSPE”) by invoking versions of the skeptical
theist principle CORNEA.1 Tweedt defines the CSPE as any argument in
which either a premise that there is gratuitous evil is non-inferentially
justified or a premise that obviously entails that there is gratuitous evil is
non-inferentially justified, with such an argument concluding that God
does not exist.2 Tweedt means to contrast CSPE with other arguments from
evil, such as that offered by William Rowe, in which that there is gratuitous
evil is inferred inductively, and to which CORNEA has already been applied
by other critics of the argument from evil. The principle CORNEA, Tweedt
notes, until now has been applied only to evidential versions of the problem
of evil, and his aim is to show its successful application to CSPE.
Tweedt concentrates on versions of CSPE by Paul Draper and Trent
Dougherty. Tweedt also argues, more briefly, against my version of CSPE,
which appeared in this journal in 1992.3 In what follows I will show that
whether or not Tweedt defeats the other two versions, he fails to solve my
version of CSPE.4 So there is a surviving version of CSPE. I begin with
brief descriptions of Draper’s and Dougherty’s version of CSPE in order

Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 394n15.
3
Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil.”
4
It might be possible to save Draper’s and Dougherty’s versions by explicating them according to my version of CSPE. Here I do not enter into that discussion.
1
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to show later how my version contrasts with theirs and thereby survives
Tweedt’s objections.
In Paul Draper’s version of the CSPE, someone’s belief that there is
gratuitous evil is prima facie justified by an experience of a particularly
poignant evil.5 The Draper scenario has these steps:
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S forms the belief non-inferentially that the evil is gratuitous.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.

What makes this scenario an example of CSPE is that S’s belief in (2) is
formed non-inferentially, not inductively.
Dougherty argues that if it seems to S that p, then S has to that extent a
reason to believe that p, and if the seeming is strong enough S can be prima
facie justified in believing that p.
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S believes non-inferentially that God would not allow that evil.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.

Again, what makes this scenario an example of CSPE is that S’s belief in
(2) is formed non-inferentially. (3)’s conclusion is said to follow trivially
from the belief of (2).
Tweedt turns back these arguments with a version of CORNEA he calls
“new CORNEA modified”:
For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, new evidence E is levering
evidence for [hypothesis] H only if it is reasonable for P to believe that: if H
were false, E would, in the situation S, likely be different.6

where “levering evidence” is evidence that has what it takes to support a
shift by P to belief, non-belief, or disbelief. On this basis, Tweedt replies
to Draper that in no circumstance is it reasonable for P to believe that if H
(that evil is gratuitous) were false, then P would likely not experience E
(poignant evil). One could be expected to experience poignant evil even
if the evil is not gratuitous. Experiencing poignant evil does not justify
thinking it gratuitous, since we cannot know enough about God’s mind to
know why God would allow this or similarly poignant evils. With respect
to Draper’s argument, the belief in (2) cannot be non-inferentially justified
from the experience in (1).
Contrary to Dougherty, Tweedt likewise argues that P’s being strongly
convinced non-inferentially that a loving God would not allow such sufferings does not justify so believing. That is because God’s acceptable
reasons for allowing poignant evils are way beyond P’s ken. The evil can
5
I note that Draper’s argument is part of a larger context of argumentation, which can be
safely ignored for my purposes.
6
Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 400.
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be poignant and yet be fully vindicated for reasons known only to God.
So, the belief in Dougherty’s (2) cannot be non-inferentially justified by
the experience in (1). For Tweedt, the CSPE presents no prima facie reason
against God’s existence.
In this exchange, all parties are assuming that gratuitous evil is inconsistent with God’s existence. This can be challenged. If God has deontic
obligations, for example, then in meeting them, such as when obligated to
keep a promise, God might have to allow gratuitous evil.7 Such challenges
should not be relevant in the context of this article, however. The sole
question here is whether CORNEA itself succeeds in solving the CSPE,
or at least neutralizing it by showing that an experience of evil cannot
count against God’s existence. If we accept an unrelated valid reason why
God could allow gratuitous evil, then why bother with CORNEA at all?
Let the CSPE have its gratuitous evils. Just point out that the CSPE fails
because gratuitous evil is consistent with God’s existence. So, in a discussion focused on CORNEA itself, we should assume that gratuitous evil is
inconsistent with God’s existence.
Getting to my version now, I had written that there is a pre-philosophical
relevance of evil to belief in God in “an experience of God’s non-existence.”
I referred to a person who has an experience of evil and “right there in the
evil perceives that God does not exist.” My claim was that there are evils
in this world that elicit atheistic experiences, that is to say, experiences in
which a person sees that the world is Godless:
What they perceive in the evil is that the world is Godless, without a God.
God’s non-existence is made manifest to them. And they perceive this nonexistence in the utter repugnance and revulsion of the evil. . . . They perceive
what they believe [about God] in the evil they know.8

Tweedt responds to this as follows:
CORNEA also works against Gellman’s version of the common sense
problem of evil in which someone’s belief that God doesn’t exist is noninferentially justified on the basis of an experience of certain evils. This is
because the alleged support fact relating the experience and the belief that
God doesn’t exist doesn’t pass CORNEA’s test. The reason it doesn’t pass
CORNEA’s test is similar to the reason given in this paragraph: according
to skeptical theists, it’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not God
exists, we would still have the same experience of poignant evils.9

In order to clarify just what I had in mind in the above paragraph I define
what I mean by an “irredeemable evil.” An irredeemable evil is one that by
its very nature is so deeply and utterly evil that there is no possible world
in which its existence should be allowed. There could not possibly exist
7
Leftow argues that God has deontic obligations in “God’s Deontic Perfection.” Pruss
argues that God has no deontic constraints before creating a world, in “Divine Creative
Freedom.” I am thankful to referees and the editor for having raised this issue.
8
Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil,” 215.
9
Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401n34 (my emphasis).
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any good reason for allowing its existence, neither somehow the evil’s
need for a greater good, nor any deontological reason. An irredeemable
evil is evil all the way down to rock bottom, as it were, so that no good nor
other reason could possibly go any deeper, as it were, to undercut it and
make it allowed. This is not a matter of not being able to imagine such a
good or such a reason, but a matter of it being utterly misguided to think
that any reason could possibly make this evil allowable. One believes this
by having come face-to-face with such an evil in one’s life. There could be
no deontological reason, in particular, to allow such an evil any more than
there could be a deontological reason when a person is hiding in your
home, not to lie to those who are pursuing him and will do him harm.
Irredeemable evil is gratuitous, but not all gratuitous evil need be irredeemable. Gratuitous evil is evil that is not justified, although there might
be a possible world in which it is justified. To say that an evil is gratuitous
is more in the nature of a prediction (or postdiction) rather than to assert
an evil inherently irredeemable.
In my version of the CSPE, what a person non-inferentially believes
is not only that an evil is a poignant evil, but that it is irredeemable. And
what I want to claim against Tweedt is that experiencing irredeemable evil
does count (defeasibly) against God’s existence. It is correct that poignant
evil is consistent with God’s existence; however, irredeemable evil is not.
Now, if my proposal were analogous to either Draper’s or Dougherty’s,
retaining stage (1), the scenario I propose would look like this:
(1) S experiences what is to S a poignant evil.
(2) S forms the non-inferential belief that this evil is irredeemable.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
This scenario would fail against Tweedt’s objection. It is undercut by
CORNEA. That an evil is poignant is not a reason to think that it is irredeemable, even if it seems to be so. If God exists we could experience
poignant evils, and believe non-inferentially they were not redeemable.
But that would not be justified. We cannot know God’s reasons for allowing poignant evils and so cannot base a belief of irredeemability
merely on poignant evils.
A fully analogous form of my argument to those of Draper and Dougherty
replaces their reference to a poignant evil in stage 1. with reference to an irredeemable evil, as follows:
(1) S experiences what S takes to be an irredeemable evil.
(2) S forms the non-inferential belief that this evil is irredeemable.
(3) S has a reason to believe God does not exist.
Here S does not take an evil to be only poignant, but to be irredeemable.
It seems to S to be irredeemable. From the non-inferential belief that it is
irredeemable, S then has a reason to believe God does not exist.
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One way of understanding 1. is as
(1a) S has a judgmental seeming that the evil is irredeemable.
That would be like S experiencing an evil, gauging its degree of evil as it
were, and S saying judgingly to herself, “This evil seems to me to be irredeemable.” The judging could be explicitly conscious, even very quick, or
implicit for S. Then, in (2), S finds herself with the non-inferentially formed
belief that the evil is indeed irredeemable. That would be something like
S looking at the table and at the door and judging that the table cannot go
through the door. S takes the table to be “door-impassible.” Then S forms
the non-inferential belief that the table is indeed door-impassible.10
Now, (1a) would not do the trick of turning back Tweedt’s argument
against me. For, then I would be arguing that its judgmentally seeming to
S that an evil is irredeemable is more likely if God did not exist than if God
did exist. Tweedt might counter that seeming judgingly cannot count, or
not count significantly, against skeptical theism. For between the perception of the evil and the judgment that the evil is irredeemable a skeptical
theist could intercede to object that S cannot be in a position to judge an evil
to be irredeemable. That is because S cannot know enough about God’s
purposes, the many goods that God knows of but S doesn’t, and the facts
of the world, and so on, to make any such judgment. So, S’s belief that an
evil is irredeemable cannot be warranted by being non-inferentially based
on seeming judgingly that an experienced evil is irredeemable. Tweedt
might conclude that “It’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not
God exists, one could still have a judgmental seeming of an evil being irredeemable.”
I leave aside the form of the argument from (1a) and strength of the
reply to it, for there is a stronger way against Tweedt than using (1a), and
that is by taking (1) as:
(1b) S perceives the very irredeemability of an evil.
In (1b) S has a perceptual seeming of the very irredeemability of an evil. To
clarify this, I want to distinguish between what I call “perceptual content”
and “embedded perceptual content.” Without getting too fussy, perceptual
content is an element or elements sense-manifest in the perceptual circumstances. This includes the perceptual content of seeing a painting to
have (manifestly) red coloring and the perceptual content of seeing it to be
(manifestly) a picture of a young man. In contrast, I will say that content, C,
is perceptually embedded in a perception, when (a) C is not a perceptual content per se, that is, is not sense-manifest content, (b) C is supervenient upon
the perceptual content proper, (c) S perceives C along within the perceptual

10
Please note that in this sense S judgingly takes X to have A does not entail that S believes
X has A. In the above example, S might take the table to be door-impassible, but not trust
her judgment, or immediately change her mind, and never form the belief that it is doorimpassible.
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content of the situation, and (d) S is non-inferentially aware of C within the
perceptual situation.
The idea is that there is perceptual content phenomenologically immediate, arising non-inferentially within a perceptual experience and
embedded in the perception of the perceptual content, such that a person
can be said to perceive that content as embedded in that perceptual context.
It is the immediate perceptual non-inferential nature of the experience
that makes people able to say that they perceive the embedded perceptual
content. (I believe this distinction to be close to the distinction Robert Audi
has in mind between qualities that are perceptual and those that are perceptible.11) Crucial here is that the beliefs about embedded perceptual content
do not simply “arise from” or are “formed in one” as a result of having had
a certain perceptual experience. These are perceptual beliefs, ones arising
directly and non-inferentially from seemings of embedded perceptual
content.
Here are four examples of what I am calling “perceptually embedded”
content.
(1) With proper training, persons can see mu-mesons in a bubblechamber. The manifest perceptual content is bubbles in liquid hydrogen. Such persons see in seeing the bubbles, non-inferentially,
the perceptually embedded content of mu-mesons.
(2) Even if we do not have a criterial notion of the relationship between behavior and looks and inner states, I can be said to see that
you are angry, immediately and non-inferentially. I do not have to
infer your anger from the way you behave or look. I see your anger,
as perceptually embedded content.
(3) Various philosophers, including Thomas Reid, believe that a person
can perceive moral qualities of a person or of an act. (Reid believed
that to have a perception of moral qualities one need not even be
consciously aware of the items upon which the moral perception
supervenes.) Moral qualities of an act, such as wickedness, are not
perceptual qualities, but can be what I call perceptually embedded in,
for example, experiencing a person who behaves in certain ways.12
A person can perceive as embedded perceptual content that an act
was wicked or kind.
(4) A person can see the beauty of a painting, as a perceptually embedded
content. That a painting is beautiful need not be an inference from
its perceptual qualities. The beauty of a painting can be perceptually
embedded, non-inferentially, in a perceptual experience. True, I might
decide that a painting is beautiful after getting an explanation about
its artistic qualities and then forming the belief that the painting is
11
12

Audi, Moral Perception, 35ff.
See Cuneo, “Reidian Moral Perception.”
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indeed beautiful. In contrast, I remember visiting the Ronald Lauder
Neue Gallery in Manhattan and entering a small room dominated by
the large painting by Gustave Klimt, “Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer
I,” also known as “The Woman in Gold.” I visually took in the painting and immediately, non-inferentially saw it, holistically, by way of
the perceptual gestalt, as it were, to be beautiful. I immediately saw
its beauty. The beauty of the painting was supervenient upon its perceptual properties and was for me an embedded perceptual content,
present within an overall perceptual content. I did not merely have
the belief “formed in me” that it was beautiful. More strongly, I saw
its beauty in seeing the painting itself.
Similar to these examples, I claim that a person can experience evil and
just see its irredeemability right there in the evil. That it is irredeemable
is embedded within the experience of the evil. A person need not simply
have “formed in him” the belief that the evil is irredeemable. He need not
judge that it is irredeemable; he sees that it is so, and his belief is a perceptual belief. In seeing irredeemable evil he sees that the world is without
an all-loving God. He “sees” that God does not exist, then, in the sense in
which he sees perceptually what is inconsistent with God’s existence.
What is crucial here is that the irredeemable nature of the evil is perceptually embedded. It is both the perceptual status, and the embedded
content being irredeemability, together that distinguish my version of the
CSPE from the others. I suspect that regarding gratuitous evil a person
could not possibly perceive the gratuitousness of an evil since, for one, a
person could not presently perceive what is going to happen in the future
over the long run. On the other hand, the perception of the irredeemability
of an evil is a perception here and now of the very nature of the evil to be
metaphysically beyond any possible allowing reason.
Objection. Seeing that evil is irredeemable is significantly different from
what each of the above four illustrations have in common: seeing mumesons, anger, everyday moral features, and beauty. What they have in
common is that the respective perceptions depend upon a person having
the appropriate background of training and/or acculturation that enables
the very perception of the embedded content to occur. Only trained
physicists will see mu-mesons; only person’s properly acculturated and
socialized will see anger in the features of an observed person; and only
morally competent persons will see wickedness in a perceptual situation.
Only a person who has rich experience of beauty will be able to just see
the beauty of the “Woman in Gold.” Yet, the objection goes, there is no
training or prior acculturation that prepares a person to be able to see the
irredeemability of the evil she is perceiving. The perception of irredeemability is more like an ad hoc, one time off, kind of experience, which puts
its validity in doubt in the way the illustrations are not in doubt.
To this I provide two replies. One is that the perception that an evil is
irredeemable could be the result of extensive moral perceptual training
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evincing the embedded perception of the evil being irredeemable. Rigorous moral training might prepare a person to morally perceive an evil
to be irredeemable. Then, just as a person could be said to perceive the
wickedness of an act, so a person could be said to see that a particular evil
is irredeemable. The ability to see irredeemable evil would be a sub-talent
of developed moral perceptual abilities.
Alternatively, it could be that no training beyond ordinary moral education is needed. For it could be that most people would have perceived
when an evil was irredeemable were it not for rich theistic acculturation
that prevents theistic devotees from seeing what is there right in front of
their eyes. If a mother is convinced that her son is innocent she might be
unable to see the obvious evidence against him for what it is. He is guilty
but she insists he is innocent. Free of the bias of theistic thinking about
God and evil, it could be claimed in this version of CSPE, that there are
evils that most people, with ordinary moral training could right off see
to be irredeemably evil. Trained on moral perception alone, one might
have such an experience of evils that he suddenly sees that they are irredeemable. No special training might be needed beyond common moral
competence.
Returning to my argument, now, plug in a perceptual principle of credulity
Credulity: If S has a perceptual seeming that p, S then has a reason to
believe that p, and there could be a great enough number of perceptual
seemings that p for S to be prima facie justified in believing that p,
where a “perceptual seeming” is either perceptual or embeddedly perceptual. So, my version of CSPE takes that if it perceptually seems to S that an
evil is irredeemable, S would have gained some reason for the perceptual
belief that an evil is irredeemable, and thus for thinking God does not
exist. If S has many such perceptions, S would be prima facie justified in
holding the perceptual belief that some evils are irredeemable, and thus
that God does not exist.
Now, let us look again at Tweedt’s argument against my version of
CSPE:
CORNEA also works against Gellman’s version of the common sense problem of evil in which someone’s belief that God doesn’t exist is non-inferentially justified on the basis of an experience of certain evils. This is because the alleged support fact relating the experience and the belief that
God doesn’t exist doesn’t pass CORNEA’s test. The reason it doesn’t pass
CORNEA’s test is similar to the reason given in this paragraph: according to
skeptical theists, it’s reasonable for us to believe that whether or not God exists, we
would still have the same experience of poignant evils.13

We must now alter Tweedt’s emphasized sentence to this:

13

Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401n34 (my emphasis).
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It’s reasonable to believe that whether or not God exists, we would still perceive
the irredeemability of evils.
This sentence does not merit acceptance. Consider, if there are no beautiful objects, I should expect not to have perceptual seemings of beautiful
objects. It follows from Credulity that it is more likely that I will perceive
a beautiful object if such exists than if not. If I do have perceptual seemings of the beauty of an object, it is more likely than not that there exist
beautiful objects. The perception counts in favor of there being beautiful
objects. If we suppose that I have a great many perceptions of beauty, that
justification would acquire further weight, and I could eventually be prima
facie justified in believing there were beautiful objects. My evidence can be
defeated. But Credulity assures me that until it is shown otherwise, I have
a reason to believe that there exist beautiful objects, and that my being
mistaken is diminished accordingly.
Schopenhauer once advised people to tour a hospital to observe the
variety and extent of human suffering in order to conclude that an allgood God does not exist. Suppose I make that tour and begin to have
many perceptions of unredeemable evil. Credulity assures me that until it
is shown otherwise, I would have prima facie justification for believing that
there are irredeemable evils. If God did exist, the chances are that I would
not perceive the very irredeemability of such a great number of irredeemable evils, while if God does not exist this can be expected, or at least not
at all unexpected.
Here lies the difference between judging-seemings and perceptualseemings. The latter are epistemically stronger than the former, for a
resultant perceptual belief is directly based on the perception. Thus, the
perceptual belief holds direct evidence for irredeemability. There is no
gap of judgment between the perception and the perceptual belief. And
in general, perceptual beliefs have autonomous epistemic standing, until
defeated. Careful now: remember that the perceptual belief itself is noninferentially derived from the perception, not evidentially derived. That is
what makes it count as a non-inferential argument on Tweedt’s definition.
It is only after the perceptual belief is formed non-inferentially that S holds
direct evidence for what follows. This counts as an example of the CSPE.
So, my scenario of the CSPE goes as follows, as opposed to those of
Draper and Dougherty:
(1) S perceives the very irredeemability of an evil.
(2) S non-inferentially forms the perceptual belief that the evil is irredeemable.
(3) S’s perceptual belief counts against the existence of God.
What is different about my scenario from the others is that in step (1) S
does not experience the evil only as poignant, and does not only take it
to be irredeemable in the sense of judging it to be so, but experiences the
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very irredeemability itself of the evil. Given (2), S now has some direct
perceptual evidence that God does not exist. (1) is more likely to be true if
God does not exist than if God does.
Again, although this works for irredeemability it does not work for just
“gratuitousness.” For consider this course of events:
(1) S perceives the very gratuitousness of an evil.
(2) S non-inferentially forms the perceptual belief that the evil is gratuitous.
(3) S’s belief, being perceptual, counts against the existence of God.
I repeat my previous observation that in contrast to irredeemability, it is
problematic to assume that gratuitousness could be an embedded perceptual content. That is because gratuitousness is more like postdiction and
prediction about what has happened and will happen in the world. It is
hard to think of this as perceptible, rather than judgmental. On the other
hand, a person could perceive the nature of an evil to be so basically and
utterly evil that, supervenient on that, a person sees that it is irredeemable.
Of course, saying that a person has a reason for believing God does
not exist or even that she is prima facie justified in so believing, does not
preclude the defeat of this justification. So, even if this version of CSPE is
sound, which I think it is, it is not decisive for showing God does not exist.
Yet, this version does show, against Tweedt, that there could be, from the
experience of evil, a non-inferential reason or prima facie justification for
God’s non-existence, not undercut by CORNEA. There exists a surviving
version of the common sense problem of evil.14
Afterword. My late cousin Binyamin was a guest of the Nazis at the work
camp of Auschwitz. He told this story, one of many, of a time he perceived
the sheer irredeemability of evils he encountered. It was the eve of December 25, 1943. The Nazis assembled all of the inmates, wholly or almost
exclusively Jews, in the camp yard. There was a huge, tall Christmas tree
in the yard and a festive stage on which the Nazi officers stood stiffly in
their best dress uniforms. A band was playing lovely Christmas carols. The
prisoners were made to stand there for a time listening to the music. Then
the Nazis hung ten Jews on the Christmas tree. The prisoners were forced
to stay there at attention until the last hanging Jew stopped moving. All
the while, the band played on, with the lovely Christmas carols.
Ben-Gurion University

14
I am indebted to two referees who made constructive comments on a previous version
of this paper. I am most grateful, however, to the editor for his insightful comments and
suggestions and for his great patience during the process of my trying to get things right. I
thank him dearly.
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